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Abstract: This paper explores the mutual implication of critical realism and 
semiosis (or the intersubjective production of meaning). It argues that critical 
realism must integrate semiosis into its account of social relations and social 
structuration. This goes well beyond the question of whether reasons can be 
causes to include more basic issues of the performativity of semiosis and the 
relationship between interpretation (verstehen) and causal explanation 
(erklären). The paper then demonstrates how critical realism can integrate 
semiosis into its accounts of dialectic of structure and agency through an 
evolutionary approach to structuration. It also demonstrates how critical 
semiotic analysis (including critical discourse analysis) can benefit from critical 
realism. In the latter respect we consider the emergence of semiotic effects 
and extra-semiotic effects from textual practices and give two brief illustrations 
of how this works from specific texts. The paper concludes with more general 
recommendations about the articulation of the discursive and extra-discursive 
aspects of social relations and its implications for critical realism. 
 
 
This paper explores the mutual implication of critical realism and semiosis. At 
least three major sets of questions can be posed in this regard.1 First, we 
consider whether critical realism can afford to ignore semiosis, provisionally 
defined as the intersubjective production of meaning,2 in its more general 
approach to social relations, their reproduction and transformation (see Section 
I). In discussing this issue we interpret social relations broadly to include not 
only individual actions and interactions but also the emergent properties of 
institutional orders and the domain of the lifeworld. Apart from addressing the 
closely related, controversial, but nonetheless analytically distinct, issue of 
whether reasons can also be causes, critical realists have paid little attention to 
the nature and significance of semiosis. Prioritizing the former at the expense of 
the latter is quite unjustified because reasons are merely one (albeit important) 
aspect of the causal efficacy of semiosis. In addition, their effectiveness can 
only be understood in and through the operation of semiosis. Second, and 
equally important for our purposes, we inquire into the social preconditions and 
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broader social context of semiosis. This set of problems is well suited to the 
application of critical discourse analysis because the latter can contextualise the 
production, communication, and reception of semiosis (see Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999). But we also show that, depending on the explicandum, it may 
be necessary to supplement critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA) through 
more concrete-complex analyses of extra-discursive domains. This implies that, 
insofar as semiosis has been studied in isolation from its context, this is bound 
to lead to an incomplete account of social causation and therefore risks 
committing one or more kinds of reductionism (see section II). Finally, we turn 
to a third set of questions. These concern the nature of semiotic structures, their 
emergence from texts and textual practices, and their role in social structuration 
(see section III). We exemplify these issues by drawing on critical semiotic 
analysis (especially CDA), which is a form of text analysis that is not only 
compatible with critical realism but also provides major insights into the role of 
semiosis in social structuration (see section IV). Overall these two sections seek 
to show that semiosis involves mechanisms that are intelligible from a critical 
realist point of view. Our concluding section draws these different themes 
together to argue that semiotic analysis might benefit from paying attention to 
other aspects of critical realism and that critical realism might benefit from 
paying more attention to semiosis when exploring the social world.  
 
Addressing these three sets of questions involves identifying and exploring the 
real mechanisms of semiosis as a first step towards making progress on the 
larger problem of mind-body-semiosis-sociality-materiality This is clearly an 
ambitious project and we do not expect to produce a solution in this paper. 
Moreover, since critical realism qua philosophy does not entail commitments to 
any particular substantive social or psychological theory, alternative critical 
realist accounts of semiosis could also be advanced. If so, we hope our own 
proposals will stimulate fellow critical realists to present them. 
 
I. Why Critical Realism Must Address Semiosis 
 
Critical realism has tended to take semiosis for granted. For example, its 
practitioners often defend the claim that reasons can be causes without making 
any substantial reference to semiosis as such. Our first objective is to oppose 
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this neglect. We will then demonstrate how a critical realist approach might be 
used to illuminate semiosis. 
 
Social theorists and discourse analysts routinely defend semiotic analysis on 
the grounds that semiosis has real effects on social practice, social institutions, 
and social order. They argue, in short, that semiosis is performative. Though it 
is certainly possible for us to communicate unintentionally, we normally speak 
or write in order to produce some kind of response. Yet answers to the question 
of how semiosis produces effects are generally conspicuous by their absence. 
This could well be due to the many uncertainties and/or controversies over the 
nature of explanation in the social sciences. For some social theorists, 
explaining how semiosis produces effects would require a causal explanation 
that first identifies what it is that produces observed effects and then attributes 
causal responsibility thereto in terms of an underlying causal mechanism (or 
mechanisms). But many other theorists reject causal explanation as being 
wholly inappropriate to the study of semiosis. For example, hermeneutics is 
generally taken to reject causal explanation (erklären) in favour of interpretive 
understanding (verstehen). Its advocates deny that semiosis and its effects can 
be explained in the same way as the production of chemical reactions and their 
effects; all that is possible (and all that is required) is to elucidate what a specific 
text 'means'. This rejection of erklären in favour of verstehen is often tied to a 
Humean account of causal explanation in terms of 'constant conjunctions' 
between causes and effects.3 Thus advocates of verstehen argue that, because 
such regularities either do not characterise communication or are irrelevant to 
its understanding, causal explanation is either totally excluded or simply 
redundant. Given the semiotic character of reasons (see below), this argument 
is linked to their conclusion that reasons are not to be treated as causes of 
behaviour. Instead, according to advocates of verstehen, reasons are 
propositions that precede or accompany behaviour and must simply be 
'understood'. If this line of reasoning were to be accepted, however, it would be 
meaningless and/or pointless to inquire into the causal efficacy of semiosis. 
 
In contrast, we argue that semiosis is both meaningful and causally efficacious, 
and we therefore need to demonstrate, using critical realist concepts, how it 
 4
produces effects. To do this we need to recall some key features of critical 
realist philosophy.  
 
First, critical realists distinguish the real from the actual and the empirical. The 
'real' refers to objects, their structures or natures and their causal powers and 
liabilities. The 'actual' refers to what happens when these powers and liabilities 
are activated and produce change. The 'empirical' is the subset of the real and 
the actual that is experienced by actors. Although changes at the level of the 
actual (e.g. political debates) may change the nature of objects (e.g. political 
institutions), the latter are not reducible to the former, any more than a car can 
be reduced to its movement. Moreover, while empirical experiences can 
influence behaviour and hence what happens, much of the social and physical 
worlds can exist regardless of whether researchers, and in some cases other 
actors, are observing or experiencing them. Though languages and other 
semiotic structures/systems are dependent on actors for their reproduction, they 
always already pre-exist any given actor (or subset of actors), and have a 
relative autonomy from them as real objects, even when not actualised.4 
 
Second, CR views objects as structured and as having particular causal powers 
or liabilities. That is, they are able to act in certain ways and/or suffer certain 
changes. Thus a person who has learned a language has a rich set of (causal) 
powers to communicate, and they have these powers even though they do not 
use them all the time.5 These powers exist (often, of course, in latent form) but 
they can be activated in certain situations. If and when they are activated, the 
effects depend on the context. Thus if we ask someone the way to the Town 
Hall, the effects of the question will depend on whether she speaks the same 
language, whether she knows the area, and so on. But regardless of whether 
the answer is 'round the corner', 'I'm sorry I don't know', or 'why do you want to 
know?', it is at least co-produced by the question, and this is true irrespective of 
whether the relationship between the question and answer is regular or 
irregular. Causation is about what produces change (the activation of causal 
powers) not about (whether observers have registered) a regular conjunction of 
cause events and effect events. Hence, regularities are not necessary for 
explanation, whether of physical or social phenomena. Even where we do find 
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regularities they still have to be explained in terms of what produces them. Thus 
critical realism rejects the Humean, constant conjunction view of causation.  
 
Third, as the preceding example suggests, critical realists argue that reasons 
can operate as causes, that is, can be responsible for producing a change. 
Indeed, when someone tries to persuade us that we are wrong to make this 
argument by giving us reasons, they in turn presuppose that offering reasons 
can be causative. This applies irrespective of whether there are regularities for 
us to record. For the general absence of regularities between giving or 
recognizing reasons and subsequent behaviour is not fatal to causal 
explanation. On the contrary, as we have seen, regularities are not essential for 
causal explanation even in the physical sciences. The effects produced by 
semiosis certainly depend on texts being understood6 in some fashion but not 
necessarily just in one, and only one, fashion. Thus a speech made during an 
election campaign may offer people strong reasons for voting in a certain way. 
The fact that the speech might be construed differently by different individuals 
(even leading them to vote contrary to the reasons adduced) and hence does 
not form part of a constant conjunction or event regularity does not mean that it 
can have no influence on voting (Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994).7 Understanding 
(verstehen) and explanation (erklären) are therefore not antithetical. 
 
Crucial though this issue of reasons as causes has been in the philosophy of 
social science, it fails to address the specific nature of 'reasons' and how they 
come to motivate action. In particular, it ignores the semiotic character of 
reasons and, in the most extreme cases, treats them as simple, singular 
triggers of action. Yet reasons are diffuse and hard to identify unambiguously. 
Indeed, it would be better be think of them as emergent elements in more 
extensive networks of concepts, beliefs, symbols, and texts. As we show in 
section II, they presuppose languages, intentionality, particular concepts and 
prior understandings and interests, intertextuality, conventions of inference and 
evidence, and so on. Even a brief reflection on the implications of this semiotic 
and social embedding of reasons is enough to bring home the inadequacy of a 
simplistic treatment of reasons. In addition, if we reflect more broadly upon what 
kinds of semiotic features and events can bring about changes in behaviour (if 
only at the level of how people think or feel), we notice that it is not only reasons 
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that change what we do. We may be influenced more by the tone (e.g. warmth, 
hostility) or imagery of a speech than by any reasons for action that it might 
present. Consideration of these expressive qualities of communication exposes 
the narrowly rationalist character of the reasons-as-causes answer to the 
question of how texts produce effects. We therefore need to go beyond the 
reasons-as-causes argument, important though it is, to examine the nature of 
semiosis more generally and its place within the overall logic of the social. 
 
II. The Social Preconditions and Context of Semiosis 
 
Social scientists who have shown interest in semiosis have tended to ignore its 
broader social context. We aim to correct this bias in the semiotic turn by 
putting semiotic processes into context. This means locating them within their 
necessary dialectical relations with persons (hence minds, intentions, desires, 
bodies), social relations, and the material world – locating them within the 
practical engagement of embodied and socially organised persons with the 
material world.  
 
Semiosis – the making of meaning – is a crucial part of social life but it does not 
exhaust the latter. Thus, because texts are both socially-structuring and 
socially-structured, we must examine not only how texts generate meaning and 
thereby help to generate social structure but also how the production of 
meaning is itself constrained by emergent, non-semiotic features of social 
structure. For example, an interview is a particular form of communication (a 
‘genre’ in the terminology we introduce below) that both creates a particular kind 
of social encounter and is itself socially-structured, for example by conventions 
of propriety, privacy and disclosure, by particular distributions of resources, 
material and cognitive. In short, although semiosis is an aspect of any social 
practice (insofar as practices entail meaning), no social practice (let alone all 
behaviours) is reducible to semiosis alone. This means that semiosis cannot be 
reduced to the play of differences among networks of signs (as if semiosis were 
always purely an intra-semiotic matter with no external reference) and that it 
cannot be understood without identifying and exploring the extra-semiotic 
conditions that make semiosis possible and secure its effectivity. We therefore 
reject the Foucauldian-inspired conflation of discourses and material practices 
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as one more instance of the 'discourse-imperialism' that has infected social 
theory for the last two decades. This conflation also eliminates the distinction – 
so crucial for critical realism – between the transitive and intransitive 
dimensions of scientific inquiry. It thereby produces the epistemic fallacies 
associated with strong social constructionism (Sayer, 2000).  
 
The intersubjective production of meaning and other semiotic effects is 
exceptionally difficult to explain, not least because it involves more or less 
inaccessible mental processes. Thus, although we offer a way of explaining the 
power of semiosis to generate meaning, and even though semiosis involves the 
listener/reception as much as speaker/production, it leaves open the question of 
how minds make sense of texts. Whilst meaning and motive are emergent 
phenomena of semiosis, they need minds with certain capabilities to co-
construct social action and interaction (and bodies to enact them). 
  
Accordingly, our approach to semiosis depends on more than semiotic systems 
(including languages) and texts. Language acquisition itself is both preceded 
by, and ongoingly presupposes, various bodily and practical forms of non-
linguistic knowledge or know-how, skills and sense. In this context, we 
acknowledge Margaret Archer's demonstration of the importance of the 
embodied, practical and non-semiotic, indeed non-social (in the sense of 
intersubjective) dimensions of human practice, and their status as preconditions 
of language-learning and use (Archer, 2000). Thus infants have to learn a 
considerable amount without the aid of semiotic systems before they are able to 
acquire the latter. In addition, text producers and interpreters subsequently 
continue to rely heavily upon on non-semiotic knowledge, bodily awareness or 
know-how in order to carry out both simple and complex tasks. This is reflected 
in two facts: first, we are often only more or less subliminally aware of 'events' at 
the margins of our fields of perception and, second, we may also respond more 
or less subconsciously to 'events'. Further, if we were not intentional, desiring 
beings with needs, semiosis would be redundant, for it would simply not matter 
what existed in reality or actuality (which provides part of the overall basis for 
the referential function of semiosis), there would be no performativity, and no 
affect or expressive communication. More generally, semiosis presupposes 
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embodied, intentional, practically-skilled social actors, social relations, material 
objects and spatio-temporality.  
 
Semiosis is also influenced by the habitus, i.e., by the semi-conscious 
dispositions that people, particularly in their early lives, acquire through 
social/material interaction with their habitat and through the social relations in 
their part of the social field (Bourdieu, 2000). Habitus and the feel for particular 
games that it provides can include different degrees of facility with respect to 
language use, for example differing capacities to deal with and learn new 
discourses or genres or styles (see below) (Bourdieu, 1991). 
 
The relationship between these elements – actors, language, texts, social 
relations, practical contexts – is one of dialectical internal relations, i.e., 
although distinct, they are not discrete (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Harvey 1996; 
Ollman 1993). Nonetheless the relative weight of these different elements within 
the overall configuration of a social action is bound to vary from case to case. In 
this regard it is worth noting that there is a range of 'semioticity' insofar as 
different social actions, events, or social orders may be more or less 
semioticised. Indeed, one might be able to construct a continuum ranging from 
technological systems through to religion in terms of the relative weight of 
semiosis and materiality in their overall.  
 
No account of semiosis can evade the issues of truth, truthfulness, and 
appropriateness; in Habermas’s terms, the production and interpretation of any 
text rests upon generally implicit (and often counterfactual) validity claims with 
respect to what is the case, the intentions, beliefs etc., of agents, and the nature 
of social relations. The interpretation of texts by social agents in the course of 
social events involves not only the attempt to understand what is meant but also 
judgements of truth, truthfulness and appropriateness, and potentially the 
attempt to arrive at explanatory accounts of the motives of other social agents 
for speaking or writing as they have, and of less immediate social causes. This 
does not mean that understanding implies agreement, though some 
disagreements (and agreements) may be based on misunderstanding. Of 
course, such interpretative effort is applied very selectively to texts and many 
receive scant attention, and the interpretability of texts (and even their 
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comprehensibility) depends upon a measure of shared assumptions between 
social agents about what is the case, intentions and beliefs, and social relations. 
(For instance, religious or various types of expert [e.g., technical] texts may be 
incomprehensible to certain social agents because of radical disparities in 
assumptions about what is the case.)  
 
Semiosis has a dual presence in the production and identification of social 
events. On the one hand, social action and social processes may be more or 
less semiotic in character. Thus, referentially, expressively and in terms of 
social relations, such action and processes will typically engage the ways of 
thinking, specific identities, emotional responses or commentaries, vocabularies 
of motives, goals, and reasons for action that are available to the various actors 
and frame the situation in which the actors 'find' themselves. Whether these 
semiotic features of social action and social processes come from public 
communication or inner conversations, they can be related to real semiotic 
causal powers and thus one of our main tasks is to try to illuminate semiotic 
causal powers and how they might be actualised (their mechanisms). And, on 
the other hand, the identification of an 'event' and its constitutive elements 
(persons, objects, places etc) from the ongoing flow of social action and social 
processes necessarily requires some act of semiotic interpretation, even if what 
happens is totally non-semiotic (i.e., purely material, physical action). This holds 
true even though (and, perhaps, precisely because) much of social life escapes 
the notice of any particular observer and, perhaps, all possible observers. 
 
Semiosis is multi-functional (Jakobson 1990; Halliday 1994). It is simultaneously 
referential (or propositional, or ideational), social-relational (or interpersonal), 
and expressive. Thus, in the Habermasian terms introduced earlier, semiosis 
raises validity claims of truth, appropriateness and truthfulness/sincerity. 
Though it should hardly need saying, we insist on the importance of all three, 
including, contra Saussureans, the role of reference: there are not only 
signifiers (e.g. words) and signifieds (concepts) but also referents; the 'play of 
difference' among the former could not be sustained without extensive 
embedding of semiosis in material practice, in the constraints and affordances 
of the material world. Just because the relation of reference between individual 
lexemes or phrases and objects to which they refer is not one-to-one or self-
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sufficient, it does not follow that language and ways of thinking are 
unconstrained by the world. Not just anything can be constructed.8 This does 
not mean that the differentiations and qualities of the world dictate the content 
of knowledge – for the latter is a fallible construction and to assume otherwise is 
to commit the ontic fallacy. But nor is the world or being dependent on 
knowledge – if one assumes that it is, one commits the epistemic fallacy. This 
pair of arguments is important in helping us to disambiguate ‘construction’ into 
its two moments of construal (the fallible ideas that inform it) and construction 
(in the sense of the material processes, if any, that follow from it) (cf. Sayer 
2000). Indeed, even in the case of social constructions such as institutions, 
what gets constructed is different from how it is construed; and the relative 
success or failure of this construal depends on how both it and the construction 
respond to the properties of the materials (including social phenomena such as 
actors and institutions) used to construct social reality. Of course, the construal 
need not refer to the material world: it could also refer to other semiotic 
phenomena, to images, smells, sounds or feelings and states of mind. 
 
III. The Role of Semiosis in Social Structuration  
 
A critical realist account of social structuration must be sensitive to the complex 
dialectic that is entailed in the emergence, reproduction, and transformation of 
social structures from social actions and the reciprocal influence of these 
emergent structures on ongoing social action (see Bhaskar 1979; Archer 1982; 
Jessop 2001). An important aspect of this dialectic is the operation of the 
evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention that shape the 
relationships between semiosis and social structuration. These mechanisms are 
common to natural and social evolution (a distinction that itself becomes less 
distinct, of course, as human action acquires an increasing role in natural 
evolution) but, as suggested earlier, their operation in the social world is bound 
to involve semiotic as well as extra-semiotic factors.  
 
Accordingly, we now want to highlight three interrelated semiotic aspects of 
social structuration.  First, semiotic conditions affect the differential reproduction 
and transformation of social groups, organisations, institutions, and other social 
phenomena. Second, these mechanisms are reflexive in the sense that semiotic 
 11
conditions affect the variation, selection and retention of the semiotic features of 
social phenomena. And, third, semiotic innovation and emergence is itself a 
source of variation that feeds into the process of social transformation. Overall, 
then, semiosis can generate variation, have selective effects, and contribute to 
the differential retention and/or institutionalisation of social phenomena. 
 
We can elaborate these arguments by listing some semiotic conditions involved 
in the variation, selection and retention of the semiotic and extra-semiotic 
features of any social phenomenon: 
a) The selection of particular discourses (the privileging of particular 
discourses over others available internally and/or externally) for 
interpreting events, legitimising actions, and (perhaps self-reflexively) 
representing social phenomena. Semiotic factors operate here by 
influencing the differential resonance of discourses. Some resonant 
discourses will subsequently become retained (e.g., through their 
inclusion into widely accepted hegemonic projects or their inclusion into 
an actor’s habitus). 
b) The enactment of these selected discourses as ways of acting, both 
semiotically (in genres) and non-semiotically (e.g., in organisational 
procedures).  
c) The inculcation of these discourses in the ways of being/identities of 
social agents both semiotically (e.g., ways of talking) and somatically 
(bodily dispositions).  
d) The objectification of these discourses in the built environment, 
technology, etc., in organisational practices, and in the body/bodies.  
e) The development of filtering devices within procedures for selecting 
these discourses and filtering out others, including genre chains. For 
instance, chains of genres in policy formation that might include policy 
proposals, consultations in meetings of stakeholders, and reports 
recommending policy decisions. A variety of different and potentially 
conflicting discourses may figure (e.g., within stakeholder meetings) but 
insofar as the genre chain is legitimised these may be unproblematically 
filtered to favour selected discourses in a report. 
f) The selection of strategies for agents (strategies for acting and for 
interpreting) which privilege these discourses (genres, styles). 
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g) The resonance of these discourses (genres, styles, strategies) within the 
broader ensemble of social phenomena to which the relevant social 
phenomenon belongs as well as the complementarity of these 
discourses (etc) with others within the network.  
h) The capacity of the relevant social groups, organisations, institutions, 
etc., to selectively “recruit” and retain social agents whose 
predispositions fit maximally with requirements (a)-(g). 
 
While the preceding list has been phrased to emphasise the role of semiosis in 
securing social reproduction, semiotic conditions may also militate against this. 
For example, relationships of contestation between discourses (i.e., 
relationships of contestation internally between agents in their semiotic aspect, 
and/or relations of contestation between the phenomenon in question and other 
associated phenomena in their semiotic aspect) may impede the 
selection/privileging of particular discourses for interpreting events, legitimising 
actions, and (perhaps self-reflexively) representing the phenomenon and 
associated phenomena. Where such contestation occurs, factors (b)-(g) in the 
preceding list will either be absent or, at least, limited in their overall operation. 
This will create in turn conditions favourable to successful innovation in the 
semiotic and extra-semiotic dimensions of the social world in the sense that 
significant variations are selected and retained to produce a durable 
transformation in that world. Among the relevant semiotic conditions here are 
the internal relations between discourses (including intertextuality) and the 
external relations that obtain between discourses concerned with associated 
social phenomena. These should be such that a new selection/privileging of 
discourses is possible, allowing the development of factors favouring the 
retention of selected discourses (b)-(g). Examples of this would include the 
absence/weakening of competing discourses internally or the development of 
new relations between such phenomena of a (partially) semiotic character 
favouring the recontextualisation of external discourses with regard to that 
phenomenon. Rather than pursue such arguments in the abstract, however, we 
will illustrate how these mechanisms actually operate. 
 
 13
IV. Semiotic Formations and their Emergent Properties: from Abstract to 
Concrete 
 
It is precisely because semiosis is the making of meaning through recourse to 
language and other semiotic systems that, as critical realists, we need the tools 
and skills of critical semiotic analysis (linguistic analysis, discourse analysis etc) 
to reflect (critically) on any text. Competent language users typically get by on a 
day-to-day basis, of course, without knowing about the arcana of critical 
semiotic analysis (hereafter CSA); but, if, as critical realists, we are interested in 
how actual semiotic effects are generated, we must focus on the complexities of 
the real mechanisms that, according to semantic content and overall context, 
produce effects that tend to escape the attention of lay persons and non-
specialist social scientists alike. This is the semiotic aspect of critical semiotic 
analysis. As regards its critical aspect, CSA (e.g. ‘critical discourse analysis’) is 
concerned with the truth, truthfulness and appropriateness of texts, their 
production, and their interpretation. That is, it is concerned with the relationship 
between semiosis and the material and social world; persons and their 
intentions, beliefs, desires etc; and social relations. It is concerned with the 
description of texts, the interpretation of how people produce and interpret texts, 
judgements of texts in terms of truth, truthfulness and appropriateness, and 
explanation of the social causes and effects of texts.  
 
Thus a CR approach to the explanation of concrete phenomena such as 
semiosis analyses them as conjunctions of structures and causal powers co-
producing specific effects. To do this it abstracts these structures, identifying 
them and considering their respective causal powers and liabilities. Having 
done this, it then moves back towards the concrete, combining the abstracted 
constituent elements, noting how they combine, with what consequences. 
While, for the sake of simplicity of exposition of critical realist method, it is usual 
to consider simple cases involving discrete structures and mechanisms, 
semiosis is an extreme case where concrete phenomena are the product of 
dialectically-related elements, and hence whose interaction is non-additive. 
Hence the abstractions made by CDA are analytical distinctions that have to be 
used in a way which acknowledges their dialectical interdependence. Concrete 
events have a more or less semiotic (‘textual’) character (a football match is an 
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event that is not primarily semiotic in character, though it has semiotic aspects, 
whereas a lecture is a primarily semiotic event) but even primarily semiotic 
events are co-produced by mental, social and material as well as specifically 
semiotic structures. 
 
Semiotic structures include semiotic systems – most obviously languages – 
which have distinctive properties (e.g., the properties formulated in grammatical 
rules) not found in other structures. Nevertheless, even languages show the 
dialectical interpenetration of otherwise operationally autonomous structures – 
i.e. they are overdetermined by other structures. Thus there is a differentiation 
of major components of grammatical systems corresponding to the referential 
and social relational functions of language (Halliday 1994). But semiotic 
systems can only partially account for texts (semiotic facets of events). In CR 
terms the gap between the productive potential (‘real’) of semiotic systems and 
the ‘actual’ of semiotic facets of events is such that other structures need to be 
postulated at lower (i.e., closer to the concrete) levels of abstraction. We call 
these ‘semiotic orders’. 
 
Semiotic orders constitute the social structuring of semiotic variation. Their main 
elements are genres, discourses and styles. Genres are ways of acting and 
interacting in their specifically semiotic aspect; they are ways of regulating 
(inter)action. An example would be (a specific form of) interview. Discourses are 
positioned ways of representing – representing other social practices as well as 
the material world, and reflexively representing this social practice, from 
particular positions in social practices. An example would be a particular 
political discourse – let us say the political discourse of the ‘third way’ (New 
Labour). Styles are ways of being, identities in their specifically semiotic (as 
opposed to bodily/material) aspect. An example would be the ‘new’ managerial 
style described by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). A semiotic order is a specific 
configuration of genres, discourses and styles, which constitutes the semiotic 
moment of a network of social practices (e.g., a field in Bourdieu’s sense, for 
instance the political field).  
 
The relationship between genres, discourses and styles is dialectical. Thus 
discourses may become enacted as genres and inculcated as styles. What 
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enters a practice as a discourse such as the discourse of ‘new public 
management’ may become enacted as new ways of (inter)acting, which will in 
part be new genres (new ways of (inter)acting discursively). And such a 
discourse may become inculcated as new ways of being, new identities, 
including both new styles and new bodily dispositions. Moreover, in addition to 
the intra-semiotic flows between discourses, genres, and styles, there are also 
flows between semiosis and other elements/moments of social practices. For 
example, it may become materialised in new buildings, new technologies, etc. It 
is important to stress again ‘may’: there is nothing inevitable about these 
‘socially constructive’ effects of discourse, they are conditional upon the 
specificity of the practice. 
 
Semiotic orders such as genres are overdetermined to a greater extent than 
semiotic systems through their dialectical articulation with other structures. For 
this reason, whereas as semiotic systems can be studied in relatively abstract-
simple terms, semiotic orders are best studied in relatively concrete-complex 
terms. The categories of semiotic systems are abstract-simple (i.e., relatively 
autonomous from other structures, e.g., ‘noun’, ‘sentence’) whereas those of 
semiotic orders are more concrete and complex (i.e., overdetermined by the 
categories of other structures, e.g., ‘discourse’, ‘genre’, ‘dialect’). 
 
Thus, whilst critical semiotic analysis attributes causal effectivity to 
semiotic/linguistic forms, it does so without falling into a semiotic/linguistic 
formalism. The effectivity of forms depends upon their semantic content and 
their social context. For example, processes in the material world may be 
semiotically represented events or as objects, in the linguistic form of finite 
clauses (e.g., ‘Multinational corporations are changing the ways in which 
different countries trade with each other’) or of nominalisations (e.g., ‘The 
modern world is swept by change’). But the social effectivity of nominalisation 
depends upon what is nominalised (reducing processes to their effectivity and 
thus concealing details of both process and agency) and on the specific social 
context in which it occurs (for more extended examples, see below). Attending 
to nominalisation as a linguistic form is germane to the critical analysis of the 
social effectivity of semiosis but this attention must be combined with an 
account of meaning and how meaning is mediated in and through textual 
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interpretation. It would make a difference, for example, whether or not there 
were widespread critical awareness of such features of texts. This lack of one-
to-one relations between formal features of texts, interpretations, and social 
effects implies that generalisations about semiosis are difficult. However, there 
is nothing exceptional about this. Social systems – and, indeed, most physical 
systems – are open and hence unpredictable. As critical realists have 
emphasised, the contingent emergence of new phenomena in and through the 
complex interactions between systems and their environments makes constant 
conjunctions rare.  
 
Semiosis is an instance of emergence par excellence and in moving back 
towards the concrete we attempt to register how meanings emerge in texts. 
When post-structuralists emphasise the endless possibilities for meanings to 
emerge from the play of difference, they are referring in CR terms to 
emergence. Intertextuality is a crucial property of semiosis in terms of 
emergence. It has more concrete and more abstract aspects. Concretely, 
particular texts report, echo etc., particular other texts for both speaker and 
listener. More abstractly, texts may stand in complex relationships to semiotic 
orders – they may articulate the discourses, genres and styles of different 
semiotic orders together in complex ways.  
 
The objection to post-structuralist accounts of emergence is that they idealise 
semiosis – they ignore reference and truth conditions and attribute properties to 
semiosis as such in a way that ignores the dialectical interpenetration of 
semiotic and non-semiotic facets of social events. The ‘play’ of difference is 
materially, socially and psychologically constrained. This is clear if we think 
about intertextuality. Texts may and do articulate different discourses, genres 
and styles together in innovative ways, but these semiotic articulations are at 
the same time articulations of social fields, social groups, social activities, 
space-times, desires etc.  
  
Semiotic emergence is tied not only to shifting articulations of discourses, 
genres and styles as such, but also to texts as processes, the ‘texturing’ of 
texts, the working together of diverse elements in texts over time and in space. 
In other words, it depends upon the causal powers of agents in texturing. The 
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following texts illustrate the processes at work here. The first text is an extract 
from a meeting of (mainly) supervisors in an Australian subsidiary of an 
American multinational company, discussing the introduction of team 
management (the data was collected by Lesley Farrell):  
Ben we thought you know maybe maybe I should be the facilitator for 
Grace's group or something where I'm away from the people a bit and 
um 
Sally yeah 
Ben just have a background in what's going on but just sort of keep 
them on the right track and let them they've got to really then rely on 
each other instead of relying on the supervisor to do the work 
Grace  well I think kind of in the groups that are gonna come along that's 
what's gonna have to happen. I mean I know the the first ones that start 
off I think we have to go down this path to try to direct people onto the 
path and therefore we kind of will be in charge of the meeting but then 
we have to get people to start their own teams and us sort of just being a 
facilitator rather than 
James  the team leader 
 [..]     yeah 
Grace  I mean it's hard to get started I think that's where people are 
having trouble and that's why they're kind of looking to you Ben and you 
know things like that 
Peter I'm not the only one I'm having trouble maintaining the thing 
 [..]  yeah 
Peter I just can't maintain it at the moment you know a couple of days 
you know a couple of days crook there and you know just the amount of 
work that builds up it just goes to the back of the queue sort of thing it's 
shocking 
James so what you really want is the um you've got a a group you start a 
group and you want one of those people to sort of come out and [..] 
facilitate the group 
Peter just to maintain the group you know like just to keep it just keep 
the work flowing 
Ben what I'm trying to get across 
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Peter cause 
Ben is I'm too close to those people because I  
[..] yeah 
Ben   already go outside of the group and then I'm their supervisor 
outside on the on the floor where maybe if I was facilitating another 
group where I'm not I'm not above them you know I'm not their supervisor 
or whatever um I can go back to my job they can go back to theirs and 
they still um you know it's this their more their team than  
Sally yours 
 
This extract shows an element of the (new) ‘global’ discourse of team 
management (‘facilitating’) being locally appropriated by being worked in the 
course of the interaction into a relationship of equivalence with elements of 
existing discourses (e.g. ‘keep them on the right track’, ‘they’ve got to really rely 
on each other’, ‘people … start their own teams’), and into a relationship of 
difference from other elements of existing discourses (e.g. ‘(being) the team 
leader’, ‘direct people onto the path’, ‘be in charge of the meeting’). The ‘work’ 
of texturing these relations of equivalence and difference is evidenced in the 
high incidence and the distribution of ‘hedging’ expressions such as ‘or 
something’, ‘just’, ‘kind of’, ‘sort of’, and ‘modalising’ expressions such as 
‘maybe’, ‘we thought’, ‘I think’, which mitigate in various ways degrees of 
commitment to propositions and proposals. The texturing of such relations of 
equivalence and difference can cumulatively produce new configurations of 
discourses and, in so far as they are enacted and inculcated, of genres and 
styles (in this case, the meeting itself can be seen as a generic enactment of 
the new discourse which it is locally appropriating). If we assume a social theory 
of learning as active participation in the innovative meaning-making practices of 
a community (Lave 1998, Wenger 1998), such examples can be seen as 
instances in cumulative processes of organisational learning that can produce 
changes in knowledge, social relations, and social identities (semiotically: in 
discourses, genres, and styles).  
 
To show how instances of semiotic emergence figure in processes of social 
transformation we must also consider the resonance of emergent semiotic 
properties within orders of discourse. The second example is a preface by Tony 
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Blair to a White Paper on Competition produced by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (1998).  
 
‘The modern world is swept by change. New technologies emerge 
constantly, new markets are opening up. There are new competitors but 
also great new opportunities. 
 
Our success depends on how well we exploit our most valuable assets: 
our knowledge, skills and creativity. These are the key to designing high-
value goods and services and advanced business practices. They are at 
the heart of a modern, knowledge driven economy.  
 
This new world challenges business to be innovative and creative, to 
improve performance continuously, to build new alliances and ventures. 
But it also challenges Government: to create and execute a new 
approach to industrial policy.  
 
That is the purpose of this White Paper. Old-fashioned state intervention 
did not and cannot work. But neither does naïve reliance on markets.  
 
The Government must promote competition, stimulating enterprise, 
flexibility and innovation by opening markets. But we must also invest in 
British capabilities when companies alone cannot: in education, in 
science and in the creation of a culture of enterprise. And we must 
promote creative partnerships which help companies: to collaborate for 
competitive advantage; to promote a long term vision in a world of short 
term pressures; to benchmark their performance against the best in the 
world; and to forge alliances with other businesses and employees. All 
this is the DTI’s role.  
 
We will not meet our objectives overnight. The White Paper creates a 
policy framework for the next ten years. We must compete more 




In Government, in business, in our universities and throughout society 
we must do much more to foster a new entrepreneurial spirit: equipping 
ourselves for the long term, prepared to seize opportunities, committed to 
constant innovation and enhanced performance. That is the route to 
commercial success and prosperity for all. We must put the future on 
Britain’s side.  
    Tony Blair (signature) 
 
   The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, Prime Minister’ 
 
This example shows the texturing together of the spacetime of ’global’ 
economic change and the spacetime of national policy formation. The text is 
organised on a problem-solution model: the problem is defined in ’global’ 
spacetime in terms of irresistible processes without social agents (e.g., ’new 
markets are opening up’, not for instance ’business corporations are opening up 
new markets’) in a timeless present and an undifferentiated ’universal’ space'; 
the solution is defined in a national spacetime in terms of what national 
agencies (’we’, ’[the] government’, ’business’) ’must’ do. Any social formation is 
faced with the problem of articulating different space-times (Harvey 1996; 
Jessop 2000), and such articulation tends to become a banal accomplishment 
of everyday life events, and a banal accomplishment in texturing. //// One 
aspect of contemporary social transformation associated with neo-liberalism is 
the sort of articulation of global and more local spacetimes illustrated here, and 
now a pervasive feature of neo-liberal discourse in business, government, 
education etc, and at international (e.g., agencies like the OECD), national, 
regional and local levels. Unlike the first example, the Blair text does not show 
semiotic emergence in process, but is rather one of many possible illustrations 
of the extraordinary resonance and ’flow’ between fields and across scales of a 
recently emergent semiotic re-articulation of spacetimes.  
 
V. Conclusions  
 
We wish to draw three main conclusions from this first cut at promoting a 
debate between critical realists and critical discourse analysts. First, we have 
argued that the study of semiosis would benefit from articulation with critical 
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realism. This has already occurred in critical discourse analysis, of course, with 
its even-handed concern with context as well as text. But we suggest that it 
should be extended to other forms of semiotic analysis. This does not mean that 
we reject the hermeneutic approach; rather, we argue that hermeneutics by 
itself cannot provide an adequate explanation of social phenomena even at the 
level of face-to-face communication and interaction. There is always an extra-
semiotic context to the operation of hermeneutics (especially if this is extended 
to the notion of the ‘double hermeneutic’ practised by social scientists) and any 
serious explanation of social phenomena must be adequate both at the level of 
meaning and at the level of social (extra-semiotic) causation. Once we reject a 
Humean account of causation in terms of constant conjunction, verstehen and 
erklären are not so much antithetic as complementary. Given the prolific nature 
of semiosis with its infinity of possible meaningful communications, 
understandings, and (mis)understandings, it is important to explore the various 
extra-semiotic mechanisms that contribute to the variation, selection, and 
retention of semiosis as well as the contribution of semiosis to the reproduction 
and transformation of social structures. 
 
Second, we have argued that critical realism would benefit from sustained 
engagement with semiotic analysis. For critical realism has tended to operate 
with an insufficiently concrete and complex analysis of semiosis. It has tended 
to take symbol systems, language, orders of discourse, and so on for granted, 
thereby excluding central features of the social world from its analysis. One 
consequence of this is that critical realism cannot give an adequate account of 
the complex semiotic, social, and material overdetermination of that world. 
Semiosis has its own distinctive elements, necessary properties, and emergent 
effects and, even though (and precisely because) these qualities and their 
associated causal powers and liabilities interpenetrate, interfere with, and 
overdetermine other types of social relations and institutional orders, they must 
be integrated into a more comprehensive critical realist analysis of the social 
world. In this way we can move to provide explanations that are 'socially (or 
semiotically) adequate' as well as 'objectively probable' in the sense that they 
establish the discursive as well as extra-discursive conditions of existence of 
the explicandum at an appropriate level of concretisation and complexification.  
 
 22
                                                
And, third, in exploring the distinctive features of semiosis, we began by 
emphasising how semiosis frames social interaction and contributes to the 
construction of social relations. Within this context we then discussed the 
construction of identities, modes of calculation, vocabularies of motives, etc.; 
and their role in providing the motivational force behind actions. At the same 
time we took pains to argue that semiosis works in conjunction with extra-
semiotic (or extra-discursive) elements. By mapping some key aspects of 
semiosis, especially its extra-discursive conditions of existence and effectivity, 
we attempted to block off a purely rationalist or ideologist view of social 
relations. In developing this argument, we oppose theorists such as Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), who, in a manner reminiscent of the analysis of the production of 
commodities by means of commodities offered by Sraffa (1960), one-sidedly 
emphasise the discursive production of discourse from discourse. This leads 
them to neglect the extra-discursive as well as the discursive factors that shape 
the resonance of semiosis and the willingness and capacity of actors (and other 
social forces) to respond to interpellations, appeals to their identities and 
interests, hegemonic projects, etc. Against this, we argue for at least equal 
weight to be given to the consumption of semiosis as well as its production. In 
particular, we have stressed that both the production and the consumption of 
symbolic systems (orders of discourse, etc.) are overdetermined by a range of 







1 A fourth question that some may want to raise is that of naturalism and, more 
specifically, whether semiotic analysis can be assimilated to the methodology of 
the natural sciences. We regard this question as misguided. What is important 
is not whether they match those of the natural sciences but whether the chosen 
approaches or methodology are appropriate for their subject matter. Answering 
the former question incidentally supplies a response to the latter, of course; our 
paper answers yes and no to the latter question. For the study of semiosis 
requires both similar and different methods from those of natural science. 
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2 We use the term ‘semiosis’ throughout this paper. Although we initially gloss it 
as the inter-subjective making of meaning, our understanding of semiosis as an 
element/moment of ‘the social’ is necessarily relational and will therefore 
emerge more fully during the paper. We prefer ‘semiosis’ to ‘language’ and 
‘discourse’ (used as abstract nouns) for two reasons. First, semiosis involves 
more than (verbal) language – it also involves, for example, ‘visual language’ 
(photographs, pictures, diagrams, etc.). And, second, ‘discourse’ as an abstract 
noun is a notoriously problematic and confusing term. In any case, we later use 
‘discourse’ as a count noun for particular positioned ways of representing 
aspects of the world. Likewise, we shall later use ‘languages’ (count noun) for 
particular language systems (e.g., English). When referring to concrete social 
events from a semiotic perspective, we use the term ‘texts’ (count noun) in an 
extended sense to include not only written texts but also spoken conversations, 
‘multi-semiotic’ texts such as TV ads (which mix words, images, sound effects, 
etc.), and so on. This extended use of ‘texts’ is common in certain areas of 
linguistics, though we recognise that it is not a very satisfactory term.  
3 For example, in her critique of Bourdieu, Judith Butler (2000) assumes a 
Humean concept of causation. Unsurprisingly, then, she fails to note that to 
acknowledge performativity is to concede the causal efficacity of discourses. 
4 Critical realists have debated whether social structures, such as those of 
language, exist independently of their enactment (Bhaskar, 1979; 1989; Benton. 
1981; Collier, 1994). 
5 This is an example of a set of powers that needs a certain amount of use if 
they are to be sustained but, at least in the short run, we have these powers 
even though they are only activated intermittently. 
6 ‘Felt’ or ‘sensed’ might better describe some of the less discursive responses. 
7 Interestingly, according to Ringer (2000), this view was shared by Max Weber, 
one of the founders of interpretive sociology. While Weber is widely associated 
with an allegedly unsuccessful attempt to unite explanatory (causal) and 
interpretive (hermeneutic) analysis, this negative judgement arises because 
most interpreters have assumed that Weber followed a Humean model of 
causation based on constant conjunctions. However, Ringer shows that Weber 
rejected this model as well as related arguments that anticipated Hempel's neo-
positivist, deductive nomological 'covering law' model of causal analysis. Weber 
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came to appreciate that that 'reasons' could be causes. He concluded that an 
adequate explanation of a specific historical, cultural or social phenomenon 
must be adequate both in terms of motivational intelligibility (i.e., its social 
meaning for the relevant actors) and its production through the contingent 
interaction of causal processes in specific circumstances. Bhaskar's first critical 
realist defence of the possibility of naturalism incorrectly cites Weber as seeing 
constant conjunctions as necessary for an adequate explanation (1989: 2, 137-
8). He presents Weber as combining a neo-Kantian methodology with 
methodological individualism and contrasts this approach with Marx's realist 
methodology and relational ontology (1989: 31). He also argues that there are 
two key differences between Weberian sociology and transcendental realism: 
(a) whereas Weber accepts, realism rejects, constant conjunctions; (b) whereas 
Weber denies, realism accepts, that correction of agents' perceptions may be a 
necessary part of a social scientific investigation (1989: 135-8). Bhaskar is 
wrong on both counts since Weber also discussed 'wrong thinking' and other 
forms of irrationality. Another problem that is directly relevant to our own 
analysis below is that Weber does not adequately distinguish between the 
actual and the real. In using terms such as ‘pressing toward’, ‘developmental 
tendencies’, ‘moving forces’, and ‘impeding’ factors, Weber supported a 
dynamic conception of causal analysis. But he also argued that such notions do 
not constitute ‘real causal interconnections’ at an ‘elementary’ level but involve 
no more than tactically useful constructs in the practice of historical reasoning 
(Ringer 2000: 76). 
8 See Archer (2000) for an interesting argument on the pre-linguistic and 
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